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Abstract  
Hausman “selectively” reviewed the contingent valuation method (CVM) literature in 
2012 and failed to find progress in the method during the 18 years since Diamond and 
Hausman argued that unquantified benefits and costs are preferred to those quantified 
by CVM. In this manuscript, we provide counterarguments to Hausman’s claims, not 
with the intent to convince the reader that the debate over CVM is settled in favor of the 
method, but rather to argue that the intellectual debate over CVM is ongoing, that 
dismissing CVM is unwarranted, and that plenty of work remains to be done for the truly 
curious researcher. 
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The contingent valuation method (CVM) has been under scrutiny ever since the 
high profile of the role of contingent valuation in litigation following the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill (Carson 2011). Contingent valuation was developed because revealed preference 
methods (e.g., travel cost) that had been used to measure non-market values were 
limited. Benefit-cost analysis, and other types of policy analysis, required empirical 
estimates of value that were still not measureable. Contingent valuation employs 
surveys containing detailed descriptions of a hypothetical valuation scenario, payment 
vehicles (e.g., taxes), payment rules (e.g., majority rule) and valuation questions 
(e.g., referenda). The initial motivation for the method came from U.S. federal 
government agencies from the 1940s to the 1980s; the National Park Service sought 
estimates of the economic value of park recreation and the Army Corps of Engineers 
was seeking estimates of water-based recreation (to justify dam building), while the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency sought empirical estimates of the value of risk 
reduction in environmental and health economics. 
The major development that launched the current controversy was the 
recognition that passive-use values, described by Krutilla (1967), could be estimated 
using contingent valuation. Existing revealed preference methods (e.g., travel cost) 
could not capture passive-use value, a potentially key component of total non-market 
value. Thus, stated preference methods, including CVM, remain the only known set of 
methods for capturing passive-use values. 
The mid 1970s through the 1990s was a period of intense methodological 
development and increased acceptance of CVM, and saw a broadening of applications 
beyond recreation and health, an expansion to developing countries, and the publication 
of a number of influential overviews. First among these was the article by Randall et al. 
(1974) in the first issue of the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
which introduced more differentiation of contingent valuation surveys from opinion polls 
by using photographs to help describe the valuation scenario. 
Two key milestones in the broader acceptance of CVM were the publication of 
the Mitchell and Carson (1989) book, which first integrated economic theory, survey 
research methods, and social science measurement issues, and the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill. The Exxon Valdez oil spill first brought contingent valuation to the attention of 
many economists, government agencies and the courts. In 1993, the U.S. National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) assembled a “blue ribbon panel” to 
assess the method. The panel concluded that, under the right conditions, the method 
could play a legitimate role in damage assessment, including the estimation of lost 
passive-use values (Arrow et al. 1993). The panel’s recommendations created a 
number of testable hypotheses that emerged in the literature of the 1990s and 2000s. In 
response to the NOAA Panel’s conditional endorsement of the contingent valuation 
method, a group of primarily Exxon-funded researchers published a compendium of 
critiques questioning the accuracy and validity of the method (Hausman 1993). 
Following this controversy, the contingent valuation method was the subject of a 
1994 symposium in the American Economic Association’s Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. Portney (1994) introduced the important issues, Hanemann (1994) 
defended the method, and Diamond and Hausman (1994) argued that, for the purposes 
of damage assessment and government decision-making, unquantified benefits and 
costs are preferred to benefits and costs quantified by the CVM, and that expert opinion 
is preferred to imperfect contingent valuation estimates of value. While Diamond and 
Hausman raised a number of important issues, their negative opinion has done little to 
quell the demand for contingent valuation research. 
In the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives held a symposium that revisited the nightmare of the “CVM 
debate” that followed the Exxon Valdez oil spill: Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao (2012) 
provide a balanced interpretation of the usefulness of the CVM; Carson (2012) is 
optimistic about the progress researchers have made in the past twenty years, which 
suggests that under the right circumstances the CVM can be a useful valuation tool; 
Hausman (2012) also “selectively” reviews the CVM literature, and fails to find progress 
during the eighteen years since Diamond and Hausman (1994). Hausman goes on to 
outline a series of potentially fatal flaws in the method, and ultimately declares the CVM 
“hopeless.” 
To be sure, Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao (2012) and Carson (2012) offer some 
counterarguments to the assertions made by Hausman (2012), but given the 
coincidental nature of the three papers, they do not provide a specific critical response 
to the potentially damning critique by Hausman. Indeed, Hausman acknowledges his 
selective reading and interpretation of a vast literature that has developed in the last 
twenty years.2 The curious reader is directed to the comprehensive bibliography of over 
7,500 scholarly papers and studies on contingent valuation provided by Carson (2011). 
The vast majority of the reviewed papers were written during the 18 years since the 
initial Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium on Contingent Valuation in 1994, 
where Hausman first pronounced upon the method. Yet Hausman’s (2012) claim that 
“three long-standing problems continue to exist,” namely, hypothetical bias, the 
divergence between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), and the 
lack of scope effects, requires a more direct and thorough response. We do so not with 
the intent to convince the reader that the debate over contingent valuation is settled in 
favor of the method— we ourselves remain cautious on many fronts—but rather to 
emphasize to non-specialist economists and others that the intellectual debate over 
contingent valuation is far from over, and that there remains plenty of research to be 
done by the intellectually curious. This is something we would hope even a skeptic 
would embrace. 
In short, we disagree with, and more importantly provide evidence that 
contradicts, Hausman’s (2012) conclusion that “despite all the positive-sounding talk 
about how great progress has been made in contingent valuation methods, recent 
studies by top experts continue to fail basic tests of plausibility.” Instead, we find hope in 
recent studies by respected experts that contingent valuation can indeed provide 
plausible value estimates as well as information on market extent and public opinion, 
and as a consequence should be one (but not the only) tool at the disposal of policy 
makers and litigants alike. This remains especially true in contexts where important 
components of the benefits of a proposed public policy or the damage claims in a 
lawsuit lie beyond the reach of evidence from existing markets. It is sometimes much 
harder to measure benefits and damages in these contexts, but this does not diminish 
the imperative that we do so if economic criteria are to be honored in social decision-
making. Further, we find that critical examination of many of the papers that Hausman 
uses as evidence against CVM in fact raise important questions about any type of value 
elicitation survey, real or hypothetical, and in some cases provide support for 
hypothetical surveys when compared to real monetary exchanges. In short, we find 
promise for the curious researcher that the CVM debate is not settled, important 
questions remain, and that a critical examination of the CVM literature will provide fertile 
ground for future research. 
 
Three Long-Standing Problems 
Hypothetical Bias 
 
Hausman (2012) examines three main issues that he believes continue to plague 
stated preference studies. The first issue he discusses is hypothetical bias, where “what 
people say is different from what they do.” Most hypothetical bias studies, whether they 
take place in environmental valuation, marketing, or public polling, use some form of the 
stylized testable hypothesis that stated preference responses are identical to responses 
to analogous questions when money or some other real outcome is at stake. If the 
hypothesis is rejected, the stated preference study is viewed as flawed. While we 
respond more specifically below to Hausman’s specific criticisms, we note that despite 
issues of dealing with the very hypothetical nature of intended behavior questions, 
hypothetical questions are regularly used to evaluate real world decisions outside of the 
realm of environmental valuation. Marketers frequently utilize hypothetical market 
situations to assess the demand for new products, the expansion of existing markets 
beyond traditional demographics, or to assess price changes beyond the realm of 
market experience (Morwitz, Steckel, and Gupta 2007). Pollsters regularly rely on 
hypothetical questions of intended voting behavior to predict election outcomes and 
understand voter preferences for campaigns (Hillygus 2011). Despite the widespread 
use of hypothetical questions by private parties with real stakes and the commitment of 
real resources on the outcomes of such surveys, discussions of hypothetical bias draw 
special ire when placed in the context of benefit-cost analysis and the potential for use 
in litigation and public policy decisions (Portney 1994). 
Hypothetical bias has been examined in numerous empirical studies, and several 
meta-analyses compare value estimates from hypothetical and real choices. For 
example, List and Gallet (2001) find that estimates based on hypothetical choices are 
on average about 3 times higher than those based on real choices, but that the 
discrepancy depends on the elicitation mechanism, the value elicited (WTP or WTA), 
and whether the good is public or private. Little and Berrens (2004) find that 
hypothetical estimates are about 3.13 times higher than those based on real choices, 
and find that referenda and correcting for respondent uncertainty can reduce this 
discrepancy.  Murphy et al. (2005) find hypothetical values are on average 1.35 times 
higher than those based on real choices. While these studies control for the elicitation 
mechanism, they do not look more specifically at respondent incentives, so it is unclear 
whether the discrepancies found should be expected based on economic theory. 
Two recent papers have fundamentally changed researchers’ thinking about 
hypothetical bias. Carson and Groves (2007, 2011) show that without a closer 
examination of the incentive structure of a particular stated preference survey, we 
cannot actually predict whether distortions due to hypothetical bias should or should not 
occur (nor the magnitude of any predicted bias), because economic theory of how 
people make choices relies on knowing the incentives faced by the respondents. Placed 
primarily in a theoretical context, Carson and Groves’ arguments regarding incentive 
properties open a new exciting line of research for applied, behavioral, and 
experimental researchers to investigate the degree to which the incentive properties of 
various question formats can reduce or increase hypothetical bias. 
Hausman cites three studies which find that “intentions to purchase new 
products” are overstated: Jamieson and Bass (1989), Hsiao et al. (2002), and Morwitz 
et al. (2007).As noted by Carson and Groves (2007),we should typically expect that 
stated intentions to purchase new products will overstate true intentions. The logic is 
that by choosing “yes” (I would buy this product), the respondent increases the 
likelihood of having the product available for possible future purchase, under the 
reasonable assumption that the survey is being used to determine whether the new 
product should be brought to market. Utility is derived from an expansion of the 
individual’s future choice set. The Jamieson and Bass (1989) study and the Hsiao et al. 
(2002) study involve products that are already available, but are relatively new to the 
market.3 In these cases, it is unclear what exactly the incentives are for the respondent, 
since responses do not influence whether the product is brought to the market and 
thereby do not expand the available set of choices. As Morwitz et al. (2007) indicate, 
purchase intention studies concerning existing products are often used by 
manufacturers and suppliers when they need to decide about “whether to increase or 
reduce production levels, whether to change the size of the sales force, and whether to 
initiate a price change.”4 However, it is not clear in this case exactly how responses will 
affect something the respondent cares about (i.e., product price). Thus, we should not 
be surprised by the findings of these studies (and others cited therein) that stated 
purchase intentions for existing products have some predictive ability, but that it is not 
always particularly strong.5 The issue is further muddled when moving from market 
goods to nonmarket goods, as is the case with most environmental applications of CVM 
surveys. It is perhaps surprising that Hausman did not more carefully consider the 
incentive structure of the surveys used in these cited studies because he points out that 
one possible cause of hypothetical bias is that the survey does not explicitly state how 
the survey responses will be used. In this case, respondent incentives are unknown, so 
there is no reason not to expect (or to expect) hypothetical bias. 
While Hausman’s use of these papers to provide evidence that intentions often 
overstate behavior is partially correct (e.g., Morwitz et al. [2007] examine the correlation 
between purchase intentions and actual sales of market goods, but they do not consider 
the magnitude of the quantity purchased), he misrepresents the purpose and 
conclusions of each. Morwitz et al. (2007) use meta-analysis to determine the 
conditions under which the correlation between purchase intentions and actual sales 
increases, and find that the correlation is higher for existing products, for durable goods, 
and when the time between the hypothetical scenario and real outcome is shorter. 
These authors conclude that “the results indicate that purchase intentions are predictive 
of future behavior, and that much of the variation in the intent-behavior relationship can 
be explained by the characteristics of the study.” Hsiao et al. (2002) develop four 
econometric models and compares which does best at linking intentions with behavior. 
He concludes that there is “a remarkably stable relationship between intentions and 
purchase over time which indicates that intentions are powerful predictor [sic] of actual 
purchase.” Similarly, Jamieson and Bass (1989) attempt to move the literature forward 
by developing models that improve forecast accuracy. The spirit of each of these papers 
is constructive and inquisitive and is inappropriately used in a destructive way by 
Hausman. These efforts in the marketing literature parallel the efforts of stated 
preference researchers who have made strides in understanding and reducing the 
magnitude of hypothetical bias in a number of ways (Loomis 2011). 
In addition to these marketing studies, we can cite at least two examples from the 
environmental economics literature where stated preference estimates of prospective 
demand under unexperienced future conditions have been shown to predict with some 
accuracy revealed behavior when the future conditions actually materialize. For 
example, Grijalva et al. (2002) conducted a predictive validity test of rock climbing trip 
behavior. Respondents were surveyed about their current revealed preference trip 
behavior and their stated preference behavior under future access conditions. Following 
the realization of the hypothetical scenarios, respondents were surveyed again. With the 
hypothetical closure of rock climbing areas, stated preference rock climbing trips fell. 
When the areas are actually closed, actual trips differed in the expected direction and 
by similar magnitudes. Similarly, Whitehead (2005) conducted a predictive validity test 
of hurricane evacuation behavior. Respondents were surveyed about their revealed 
preference evacuation behavior after low-intensity storms and about their stated 
preference behavior after both hypothetical low-intensity and hypothetical high-intensity 
storms. Two hurricanes followed the survey, and respondents were surveyed again to 
determine their actual behavior. Models using revealed and stated preference 
evacuation data forecast actual behavior with prediction errors between .015 and .15 on 
a zero-to-one probability scale. 
One of the four key areas of future stated preference research noted by Kling et 
al. (2012) is the need for validity tests on consequential surveys. Following Carson and 
Groves (2007), a consequential survey is one in which respondents believe their 
responses will affect something that they care about. Only for consequential surveys 
with well-defined incentives can economic theory make predictions about how 
respondents should answer, and therefore whether one should expect hypothetical bias. 
In support of the efficacy of consequentiality in hypothetical value elicitation, Kling et al. 
(2012) cite Vossler and Evans (2009) and Landry and List (2007), who find no 
hypothetical bias when responses are consequential, and Poe and Vossler (2011),who 
conduct four consequential laboratory experiments, and also demonstrate a lack of 
hypothetical bias. The consequentiality paradigm is further supported by Vossler, 
Doyon, and Rondeau (2012) in a field experiment context, and Bulte et al. (2005), 
Herriges et al. (2010), and Vossler and Watson (2013) in a field survey context. 
Johnston (2006) compares voting behavior in an actual referendum to that in a 
hypothetical CV referendum on the same issue, and where the incentives are designed 
to be as similar as possible; he finds no evidence of hypothetical bias, and points out 
that most studies comparing hypothetical and real referenda do not have the same 
incentive structure.  
In the absence of true consequentiality, a number of approaches to mitigating 
hypothetical bias have become popular (Loomis 2011). Some researchers find that the 
divergence between hypothetical and actual WTP is mitigated or eliminated through 
ancillary survey mechanisms such as “cheap talk” survey design, or more recently, 
oaths. Cheap talk in the valuation context involves providing respondents with additional 
instructions that explicitly encourage them to treat the hypothetical scenario as if an 
actual monetary transaction were taking place (Cummings and Taylor 1999; List 2001). 
More recently, researchers have investigated the efficacy of other ancillary 
survey mechanisms for reducing hypothetical bias. Jacquemet et al. (2013) use a 
variation of a “solemn oath” to tell the truth and find it effective in reducing the gap 
between real and hypothetical responses.6 In a CVM setting, Carlsson et al. (2013) find 
that an oath script has significant effects on hypothetical response behavior across 
individuals and across multiple countries that is consistent with what would be expected 
from reduced hypothetical bias. However, because their survey is a non-experimental 
CVM application, they provide no direct evidence that hypothetical bias is reduced 
relative to a real treatment. Jacquemet et al. (2013) apply their version of the oath in an 
induced value second-price auction experiment for dolphin protection, and conclude that 
“For induced value, we find the oath-only treatment induced sincere bidding behavior on 
average within a second-price auction; the other hypothetical and real treatments did 
not,” [italics added]. 
Still more researchers advocate for various forms of “scenario adjustment”, 
including controlling for and netting out respondent departures from the conditions 
described in the offered choice scenarios (Cameron and DeShazo 2013) or taking into 
account the level of certainty respondents have that they would actually make the same 
decision if the choice was real (Champ and Bishop 2001; Blumenschein et al. 2008). 
Adjusting for certainty can produce “hypothetical” results that are often close to “real” 
values, and these alternative levels of WTP allow for sensitivity testing when CVM 
estimates are used in benefit-cost analysis (BCA). The CVM literature has not reached 
a conclusion about which hypothetical bias adjustment approaches should be used.7 
This is one of the areas that require more research. However, the current practice 
seems promising, which leads us to assert that a range of likely numbers (e.g., WTP 
estimates) that likely includes the most accurate values is certainly better than no 
number. 
The Carson and Groves paradigm for assessing the predictive ability of stated 
preference surveys has been extremely influential.8 The concept of consequentiality is 
relatively new, and although Carson and Groves have established a clear definition of 
what constitutes a consequential survey, the empirical methods used to measure and 
control for it vary in the literature, with mixed results. More studies that compare 
hypothetical and real choices, but which also focus on incentive structure of the 
questions, are therefore needed. 
 
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept 
 
Since the onset of stated value elicitation surveys, researchers have been troubled by 
the seemingly simple finding, perhaps obvious to some, that compensation demanded 
(WTA) regularly exceeds compensation paid (WTP). Based on this commonWTA/WTP 
gap, researchers have split along two lines in their conclusions. Some dismiss 
contingent valuation based on the naı¨ve premise that the gap represents a violation of 
basic economic theory and thus invalidates value elicitation surveys. Others remain 
curious about the cause of the disparity and wonder whether the gap can be explained, 
either within the neoclassical framework, or by necessary extensions to this framework 
that draw upon psychological insights from behavioral economics. In dismissing 
contingent valuation, Hausman (2012) claims that “Basic economic theory suggests that 
[questions phrased to elicit willingness to pay to avoid a negative outcome and 
questions phrased to elicit willingness to accept the negative outcome] should give 
(approximately) the same answer . . .” Indeed, using income elasticity estimates from 
over 200 published studies comparing WTP and WTA, McConnell and Horowitz (2003) 
“conclude that the ratio WTA/WTP is too high to be consistent with neoclassical 
preferences.” The McConnell and Horowitz results rely on existing studies, most (if not 
all) of which rely on the parametric specification of elasticities, which derive either 
implicitly or explicitly from assumed consistent neoclassical preference structures 
between WTP and WTA.9 McConnell and Horowitz (2003) remain open to the 
possibility that neoclassical preferences may not always be an appropriate assumption, 
noting that their results “should help in developing explanations and alternative models, 
since income effects are such a prominent part of economic models such as choice 
under uncertainty.” In other words, the WTP/WTA disparity is not a death knell for CVM, 
but rather a call for the curious researcher to more closely examine the assumptions 
and structures leading to these seemingly anomalous results. As noted in the previous 
section, recent research into the incentive properties of question formats can influence 
WTP measures. Most existing studies of the WTP/WTA gap draw on question formats 
with potentially incentive-incompatible question formats or preference structures. As 
such, the impact of incentive properties on the WTP/WTA gap remains largely 
unexamined. 
While Hausman’s claim may be true in terms of the “basic economic theory” that 
prevailed prior to the discovery of the WTP/WTA gap, he ignores an expanding body of 
literature that includes contributions from those who have been curious about whether 
there is an explanation that provides both an updated theoretical framework and 
experimental evidence that the gap can be explained within a slightly more general 
version of basic economic theory—although the debate remains unsettled.  
One illustrative strand of this literature (but by no means the only set of 
contributions) begins with Hanemann’s (1991) American Economic Review piece in 
which he lays out a neoclassical explanation for the WTP-WTA gap. Hanemann notes 
that the difference between WTP and WTA, or more precisely the difference between 
Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations, hinges on the ratio of the income 
elasticity to the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution. Hanemann goes on to argue that 
it is likely that the elasticity of substitution for unique goods, such as those often valued 
in contingent valuation surveys, is likely to be particularly small, thus increasing the 
expected difference between neoclassical compensating and equivalent variation. 
Shogren et al. (1994) use a series of market and nonmarket experiments to test 
Hanemann’s neoclassical substitution hypothesis and conclude: “Our experimental 
results support [Hanemann’s] argument that the degree of substitutability between 
goods may drive the difference between WTA and WTP measures of value.” Revisiting 
the experiments of Shogren et al. (among others), Morrison (1998) finds that “even 
when allowing respondents to learn through repeated trials, controlling as much as 
possible for Hanemann’s substitutability argument . . . the result of WTA exceeding 
WTP not only remains, but remains strongly significant.” Shogren and Hayes (1997) 
counter “that the WTP-WTA disparity depends on the auction institution, not on a 
deviation from neoclassical rationality as suggested by the endowment effect,” again 
highlighting the importance of understanding incentives. Hausman’s 2012 selective 
oversight of such work allows him to dismiss contingent valuation on the grounds of 
violations of basic economic theory noting that: 
 
Various efforts have been made to extend the neoclassical framework in a way that rationalizes 
the gap. Proponents of contingent valuation have attempted rationalizations of these 
differences, but have not overcome the findings of Diamond and Hausman (1994) or the results 
of Milgrom (1993). Both papers demonstrate that the attempts to rationalize the well-recognized 
and persistent disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept fail as a matter of 
economic theory and observed empirical outcomes. 
 
In a recent exploration of the impacts of reference dependence (i.e., endowment 
effects), Knetsch (2010) notes, in a particularly relevant footnote: “One somewhat 
unfortunate consequence of the many reports of large disparities between WTA and 
WTP valuations in contingent valuation surveys, is that many, especially environmental 
economists, have taken these disparity findings to be the result of a problem of the 
inadequacy of contingent valuation methods to accurately measure people’s values 
rather than taking it more seriously as one of people valuing losses more than gains.” 
Knetsch goes on to argue that the appropriate measure of value (WTP or WTA) will 
depend on the initial assignment of property rights, perceived or otherwise. This creates 
potential difficulties in the interpretation of benefit-cost analysis. 11 However, the 
prevalence of a WTP-WTA gap, or the existence of endowment effects, is not a fatal 
flaw in the contingent valuation method in and of itself, nor is it unique to CVM. Knetsch 
(2010) cites several lab and natural experiment studies that also find a large gap.  
Based on our own reading of the literature, we are not ready to close the WTP-
WTA debate. And apparently, we are not alone: 
 
A subtle controversy exists in the literature. At issue is the existence and interpretation of a 
possible gap between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”). . . . In spite 
of the enthusiastic interpretations of the WTP-WTA gap as a fundamental feature of human 
preferences . . . in fact there is no consensus about whether the literature, considered in its 
entirety, supports such interpretations (Plott and Zeiler 2005). 
 
Scope Test 
 
Hausman argues that contingent valuation studies tend to fail the “scope test,” 
and those that do pass the test fail to pass it “adequately.” At the same time, he 
acknowledges that “We do not know how large scope effects should be.” We share 
Hausman’s (2012) ignorance about what would constitute scope effect “adequacy.” A 
simple theoretical model of WTP, a difference in expenditure functions with changes in 
quality or quantity, can be used to show that WTP is nondecreasing in quality or 
quantity (Whitehead, Haab, and Huang 1998). The size of scope effects may be limited 
by diminishing marginal utility or substitution among nonmarket goods or between 
nonmarket and market goods. For example, Rollins and Lyke (1998) find that people do 
distinguish between existence goods of different scope, but due to diminishing marginal 
valuations for larger scope goods, estimated differences between the values of larger 
scope goods may be negligible unless sample sizes are adjusted accordingly. 
Additionally, Amiran and Hagen (2010) develop a formal model of scope with bounded 
utility functions and show that relatively small scope effects are not inconsistent with 
economic theory. The size of the scope effect in this model depends explicitly on the 
substitutability between market and nonmarket goods.  
Hausman considers the “Diamond-Hausman adding up test,” developed by 
Diamond (1996) to be the definitive scope test. To illustrate the adding up test and other 
scope tests, suppose there are three samples of CVM respondents, as depicted in 
figure 1.  
Sample 1 is presented a choice or WTP question for A, and then a second 
question for A+B. Sample 2 is presented a choice or WTP question for B, given that A is 
already provided as part of the consumption bundle and payment has already been 
extracted (labeled as B | A). Sample 3 is presented with a single choice or WTP 
question for the joint provision of A+B. Success in an adding up test occurs when the 
sum of WTP from the first question posed to sample 1 and sample 2 is equal to the 
WTP of sample 3. The standard scope test in the CVM literature, known as the external 
(i.e., split-sample) scope test, is a comparison of values across the first question for 
samples 1 and 3. Willingness to pay for A+B should be greater or equal  
 
Figure 1 Samples used in various scope tests 
 
 
 
 
to WTP for A. The so-called internal scope test is a comparison of the first and second 
WTP values for sample 1. Again, WTP for A+B should be greater than or equal to WTP 
for A. The adding up test imposes a specific structure on the preference function, which 
may not be appropriate. External and internal tests do not impose any such structure. 
Hausman (2012) highlights the evidence provided by Desvousges, Mathews, and 
Train (2012), who review 109 studies that report external and internal scope tests, and 
find that 36% pass the test, 15% fail the test, and the rest have mixed results. 
Desvousges, Mathews, and Train (2012) find only a few studies that provide enough 
information to conduct an adding up test. The axiom of revealed preference (on the part 
of CVM researchers) suggests that external and internal scope tests are preferred to the 
adding up test. One reason for the rejection of adding up as an appropriate test by CVM 
researchers is the unnecessary structure imposed on preferences. Another reason is 
that the adding up test asks respondents in sample 2 to assume that A has been 
provided by the policy process and payment has already been extracted. This more 
complicated counterfactual scenario substantially increases the cognitive difficulty of the 
valuation task (Hanemann 1994). Also, the adding up test requires three subsamples, 
which increases the cost of a study substantially. It is apparently not clear to many 
researchers whether the benefit of conducting the adding up test, relative to the more 
straightforward external and internal scope tests, is worth the cost.  
Given the absence of any explicit adding up test for most of the 109 scope-effect 
papers in the literature, and the fact that the adding up test is not the only valid test for 
adequate sensitivity to scope, it is necessary to more closely examine the types of 
scope tests that are routinely conducted. When considering whether an individual study 
adequately passes a scope test, any meta-analysis should consider characteristics of 
the study that might drive scope-testing results. Smith and Osborne (1996) conduct a 
meta-analysis of studies focused on the value of changes in visibility at U.S. parks and 
find clear responsiveness of CVM estimates to scope. These authors warn, however, 
that scope predictions are sensitive to theoretical assumptions imposed during model 
estimation. Richardson and Loomis (2009) find that the size of the population change is 
statistically and economically significant in a meta-analysis of 67 WTP estimates of 
protection for threatened and endangered species. In two specifications, the scope 
elasticity of WTP is not statistically different from one. Ojea and Loureiro (2011) 
undertake a meta-analysis of 355 biodiversity contingent valuation studies that focus on 
the issue of scope-test satisfaction, and find that scope effects are more likely to be 
found when scope is measured absolutely instead of relatively. 
The type of valuation question might play a role in scope sensitivity. Without 
providing empirical evidence, Carson and Groves (2007) argue that a consequential 
referendum is more likely to produce scope effects. This remains an open question for 
research. Empirical tests of the scope elasticity theory developed by Amiran and Hagen 
(2010) would also be useful. A meta-analysis based on the 109 studies reviewed by 
Desvousges, Mathews, and Train (2012), with further examination of what is meant by 
“mixed” results, is needed to determine the factors that influence scope failure. 
 
Other Issues  
 
In addition to his three primary critiques, Hausman (2012) raises a number of 
other issues which we feel deserve further reflection. 
 
The Use of Experts 
 
In response to questions about how to handle nonuse values in decision-making 
without recourse to stated preference surveys, Hausman advocates the use of experts: 
“[P]ublic policy will do better if expert opinion is used to evaluate specific projects, 
including non-use value . . .” This argument is also made in the original Diamond and 
Hausman (1994) paper. Beyond the arrogance of assuming that experts know better 
what the value should be than the public itself, the use of experts in the valuation 
process raises a number of new and important questions.  
What kinds of experts should be included on the suggested expert panels? It is 
hard to imagine that non-economists would be better equipped than economists to 
assess passive use value, or even to be familiar with the concept in order to consider it 
in the first place. For ecological services, for example, are we to substitute ecologists’ 
subjective opinions about “intrinsic value” for the instrumental values required for 
benefit-cost analysis? How are these intrinsic values to be monetized? Why would 
experts be better than non-experts at determining the monetized nonuse values 
accruing to society? After all, decision-makers are usually interested in the preferences 
of the general public, so it is difficult to see howexperts, as a highly selective sample 
from the general population, should be better informed about social values than 
nonexperts, that is, a representative sample from the general public stating their own 
preferences directly. If we are discussing whether a given environmental project does or 
does not deliver a specific increment of physical ecological function, then generally an 
expert is better informed than the average person. But value is distinct from function. 
We might expect that the average person knows his own preferences better than the 
expert, conditional on full information. Whether we can accurately elicit that value from 
the public brings us full circle back to Hausman’s critique of methods addressed 
previously.  
The more practical question, and really the most fundamental one, is how these 
alleged experts can determine nonuse values without having first conducted at least an 
implicit stated preference study as the basis for their expertise in judging societal 
nonuse values? It is well-known that the distinctive characteristic of passive use value is 
that there is no observable related behavior from which to judge people’s willingness to 
make tradeoffs for the benefit in question. The role of the stated preference survey, 
explicitly, is to create a situation in which we can observe this willingness. Hausman’s 
argument is that because stated preference surveys cannot reliably elicit information on 
preferences, then an expert panel is preferred. The problem is that no expert can claim 
to know the preferences of a particular population without having first made at least 
some informal observations about people’s willingness to make tradeoffs. Although set 
in a different context, Smith’s (2010) comment on the prospect of relying on expert 
panels is worth noting: “This suggests that all we need to do is convene an expert panel 
that will somehow come to a consensus. I have lost count of how many conferences 
and conference sessions have been charged with this task and have failed to arrive at a 
consensus value.”  
Surveys of experts, known as Delphi surveys, have been used in other 
disciplines for eliciting baseline estimates of population quantities of interest. Under this 
method, a group of experts reply to questionnaires and then receive feedback in the 
form of a statistical representation of the group response, after which the process 
repeats itself. The goal is to reduce the range of responses and arrive at something 
closer to expert consensus. The use of Delphi surveys may offer an opportunity for an 
increased role for expert opinion, but the only sure way to know if Delphi surveys 
provide accurate estimates of value is to also survey the population for whose value the 
experts endeavor to estimate. Given sufficient replications of accurate expert estimates, 
it may turn out to be a useful and potentially much cheaper valuation method. But here 
is the problem: Hausman argues that estimates elicited from the public are unreliable to 
begin with, which means it is impossible to ever discern if the Delphi method provides 
accurate value estimates or not. In the absence of such surveys of the public, as argued 
already, the so-called experts can have no baseline upon which to express their initial 
estimate of value, and if none of them have such information in hand, then the iterative 
process of the Delphi method will simply result in increased precision where there is no 
accuracy, ultimately yielding a false “consensus” of value.  
Thus, the actual choice of passive use value estimates we are confronted with is 
not, as Hausman would have us believe, between those of a wholly unreliable stated 
preference survey and those of a reliable expert measure of passive use value. Instead, 
it is between the values advocated by a statistically uninformed, highly selective and 
potentially biased “expert” panel, and those implied by a stated preference survey that is 
possibly flawed, but nevertheless broadly and systematically informed (in the sense of 
actually being based on direct input from a large representative sample drawn from the 
population of interest).  
If Hausman is instead arguing only that the possible existence of passive use 
values should be acknowledged by these experts but that they should go no further in 
quantifying the magnitudes of these values, then his advice is even less useful. Mere 
acknowledgement of passive use values cannot be incorporated into a decision process 
in any systematic and meaningful way. Given the mandate in the United States for 
formal benefit-cost analyses for significant policies or regulations (Smith 1984), failure to 
monetize the whole category of passive use benefits creates the risk that the value of 
these benefits will be defaulted to zero in arriving at the bottom line of a net benefits 
calculation. When expert opinions about values are substituted in lieu of stated 
preference evidence, it is inevitable that the process of high-stakes policy-making will 
produce challenges to the basis for their expertise about societal values. Evidence-
based policy-making requires just that: evidence. The comparison of all the costs of an 
action to all the benefits of an action is the decision criterion that separates economics 
from other disciplines. We acknowledge that using contingent-valuation surveys to 
estimate the value of some things, such as certain obscure ecosystem services, 
presents a challenge; giving up on the proper measurement and incorporation of some 
(potentially sizeable) benefits, however, means giving up on proper BCA. BCA should 
not necessarily be the only criterion used in decision-making, but it is the economic one. 
And although it is always necessary to determine how much weight BCA actually ends 
up having in any decision process, Hausman has no greater authority than anyone else 
in determining whether passive use values should or should not be formally 
incorporated into the decision process. 
 
Altruism and BCA.  
 
Hausman also argues that values deriving from altruism should not be 
incorporated into BCA, and that it is difficult to identify and exclude altruistic values from 
stated preference studies. There are two main classes of altruism, non-paternalistic and 
paternalistic (Jacobsson et al. 2007), with the former generally causing more theoretical 
difficulty in CVM. Non-paternalistic altruism is when one cares about another’s general 
well-being (i.e., utility level), whereas paternalistic altruism is when one cares about 
another’s level of a particular component of utility. The risk with non-paternalistic 
altruism is that a single person’s utility is captured more than once in the value estimate 
(because it appears in the utility functions of others). Bergstrom (1982) showed that the 
rule for the Pareto efficient level of a public good (i.e., the Samuelson rule) is the same 
in the presence or absence of non-paternalistic altruism. This implies that we require 
purely “selfish” values—excluding altruistic values—for determining optimal outcomes. 
However, one of the assumptions made by Bergstrom was that the considered change 
be small and that the economy already be near the Pareto efficient level of the public 
good. Flores (2002) showed that for discrete (large) changes in the public good, such as 
are often the subject of CV studies, the selfish benefit-cost test is sufficient but not 
necessary for making an efficient decision. That is, it is possible to fail to accept a good 
proposal (from a BCA point of view) using only selfish values. Bergstrom (2006) agrees 
with this conclusion.  
Non-paternalistic altruism causes difficulty because in its presence, the benefits 
of a project actually depend on the distribution of the costs of the project (Flores 2002). 
To see why, consider a thought experiment involving two projects with identical 
expected outcomes and total costs of implementation, the second of which places a 
heavier cost burden on someone for whom the respondent feels non-paternalistic 
altruism. For this respondent, the benefits of the first project are larger than the benefits 
of the second project. Curious researchers can investigate ways to detect altruism in 
WTP or choice question responses and, if possible, to develop value estimates that 
both include and exclude the altruistic component for comparison. Such researchers 
can also investigate the way in which the distribution of costs of a proposed project 
influences value estimates. 
 
Unstable and Inconsistent Preferences 
 
A recurring theme throughout Hausman’s (2012) paper is the assertion of 
unstable preferences as an indictment of CVM methods. For example, on page 53 he 
writes: 
 
. . . the primary argument that is relevant for thinking about contingent valuation methods as 
awhole is that the answers from such studies are unstable and inconsistent, invented for the 
moment of the survey, and cannot be treated as preferences in the sense that economist 
understand that term.  
 
Although the papers in the Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium focus mostly 
on the validity of the CVM (e.g., hypothetical bias and scope), the assertion that CVM 
responses are “unstable and inconsistent” is a statement about their reliability, not their 
validity. Hausman does not properly support his assertion about the unreliability of CVM 
with references to the literature.  
Validity is the extent to which a valuation method generates a measure that is 
unbiased, that is, an estimate centered around the true value, if it were known. Validity 
is difficult to demonstrate when valuing nonmarket goods and services because, by their 
nature, their “true” value is unknown. A valid method for estimating these values is thus 
one that attempts to provide an unbiased estimate around an unknown and 
unobservable quantity.  
Reliability is the extent to which a valuation method consistently generates the 
same measure. Reliability tests focus on the within and across study variation in 
estimates rather than the ability of studies to produce unbiased estimates of value. The 
lower the variability in estimates, the more consistent and the less influenced by 
researcher decisions are the estimates. High variability allows seemingly innocuous 
decisions by practitioners to significantly influence results in one direction or another, so 
unreliable results cannot be defended against the criticism that the researcher may be 
determining the result.  
Most CVM research finds that WTP values have some degree of stability over 
time (e.g., Brouwer 2006). Test-retest (temporal) reliability involves conducting more 
than one CVM survey with time between surveys using the same or a different sample 
of respondents. If the magnitude of WTP is consistent across time, then WTP is 
considered temporally reliable (e.g., Carson et al. 1997). However, a difference in WTP 
over time does not necessarily indicate unreliable results. If WTP changes over time in 
response to changing factors that would be expected to affect WTP, such as bubbles in 
housing markets or a significant recession, then the researcher may still conclude that 
the results are reliable (e.g., Whitehead and Hoban 1999). Overall, it is important that 
CVM studies demonstrate some degree of both validity and reliability. We are also not 
convinced that unstable or constructed preferences are unique to CVM. The formation 
of preferences has to begin somewhere. The formation of preferences on the spot in a 
survey does not necessarily invalidate them for those who have no prior preferences or 
experience. When confronted with unfamiliar but interesting products in real markets, 
people also sometimes make impulsive, spontaneous, or ill-advised purchases that they 
may subsequently regret. Perhaps the preferences elicited by CVM are in their “infancy” 
stage, but this can be true for market goods and services as well (new products are 
introduced all the time). It is also probably safe to say that (almost) everyone has well-
formed preferences for money, so one can at least make a “no-purchase” decision 
based on well-defined preferences for “all other goods” relative to the proposed public 
good with unfamiliar qualities (expressed by a vote against the provision of that good in 
a consequential referendum). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Hausman (2012) makes an effort to debunk the CVM once and for all, thereby 
removing it from the research agenda and from use in litigation and public policy. A 
compelling counterargument to Hausman’s claims is to note that Hausman takes the 
results of many of his selected studies at face value. While compelling, a similar claim 
can be made about many of the reflections made in this paper; some of the works cited 
are selected to provide a specific, non-critical, face value, counterargument to points 
made by Hausman, while others are examined more critically to provide the curious 
reader with an opportunity to examine for themselves some of the unanswered 
questions that remain in the ongoing CVM debate. While critical examination of every 
paper cited herein, or in the broader literature for that matter, is a worthy goal, the 
vastness of the literature, and space limitations, prevent a comprehensive critical 
analysis here.  
Nevertheless, in direct response to Hausman’s selective interpretation of the 
literature, we believe that the overwhelming amount of evidence shows: (1) the 
existence (or nonexistence) of hypothetical bias continues to raise important research 
questions about the incentives guiding survey responses and preference revelation in 
real as well as hypothetical settings, and contingent valuation can help answer these 
questions; (2) the WTP-WTA gap debate is far from settled and raises important 
research questions about the future design and use of benefit cost analyses in which 
contingent valuation will undoubtedly play a part; and (3) CVM studies do, in fact, tend 
to pass a scope test and there is little support for the argument that the adding up test is 
the definitive test of CVM validity.  
We are in complete agreement with Carson (2012), who concludes “the time has 
come to move beyond endless debates that seek to discredit contingent valuation and 
to focus instead on making it better.” Proponents of the CVM and other stated 
preference methods should continue to make cautious claims about the accuracy of 
CVM results. As the stated preference literature has expanded from simple CVM 
questions into the realm of choice experiments, contingent behavior and experimental 
economics, many of the remaining questions about CVM continue. Choice experiments 
should be given closer scrutiny to determine if they are an improvement over, or simply 
an alternative to CVM, and if they have better incentive properties than well-designed 
CVM questions.  
Throughout this reflection, we have highlighted a multitude of unanswered 
questions that remain for the curious, some of which include the following: Do incentive 
properties of questions affect the WTP/WTA gap? How do we, as researchers, 
determine whether respondents face the same set of incentives we believe they face? 
Is consequentiality measurable, and if so, how do we measure it? In the estimation and 
calculation of WTP, are we controlling for the behavioral influences and deviations from 
assumptions about such behavior that we think we are controlling for? In the context of 
natural resource damage assessment, CVM-based damage assessments are useful as 
starting points for damage awards. In benefit-cost analysis, CVM estimates are useful 
as baselines or bounds around which sensitivity analysis should be conducted. Our 
hope is that the economics profession does not blindly accept the flawed “dubious to 
hopeless” pronouncement. 
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